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Background
In a complete food supply chain from suppliers to consumers, any illegal economic 
behaviors occur in any one of the links from the raw materials suppliers to the food 
retailers, which will cause different kinds of food safety risk. In fact, food safety risk 
incidents are caused by many factors, including the food markets failures which is from 
the food markets’ externality, and information asymmetry (Resende-Filho and Hurley 
2012; Kim and Kim 2013; Jones and Davidson 2014; Fellmann et al. 2014; Zissis et  al. 
2015; Levi and Zhang 2015; Zhang et al. 2015; Wang and Pallis 2014), and the mismatch 
between the costs and the benefits made the center of interest gravity shift toward the 
downstream of the industry, food companies paid too much attention to the market 
share, and the risks which were accumulated by the upstream interests contradiction to 
the extreme through the transmission of leverage effect (Lamboni and Azouma 2013; 
Hobbs et al. 2014), etc. In China, the accidents of food safety frequent occurred, which 
have led to consumers’ lack of social trust on food safety extremely (Wu et al. 2014). This 
reason is the lack of the perfect regulatory system and the perfect legal system in food 
safety supervision and consumer protection. Thus our paper will consider the selection 
of these relevant variables, including the sampling probability of the government in the 
production link and the retail link, the probability of taking legal action to defend their 
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rights and interests after consumers find unqualified products, and the probability of 
winning after consumers take legal action and so on.
The others factors caused food safety risk and its spread including the interest game 
imbalance between all the main participant bodies in the food supply chain (Henry and 
Wernz 2015), the “adverse selection” of members of the food supply chain (Gil et  al. 
2015; Luning et al. 2015; LeBlanc et al. 2015) and “moral hazard” behavior of members 
of the food supply chain (Malekan and Dionne 2014; Wang and Pallis 2014; Weber 2015; 
Verrette 2015). These can lead to the spread effect of food safety risk in the food sup-
ply chain. Food safety risk existing in anyone of link in food supply chain. And which of 
any node of food supply chain would pass on the food supply chain to spread, and often 
present the amplification effects, then led to the occurrence of food safety incidents 
eventually (Bae et al. 2011; Hirschauer et al. 2012; Kirezieva et al. 2013; Boxstael et al. 
2013; Manning and Soon 2013; Duret et al. 2014). From the perspective of food supply 
chain, which could realize that enhance the food supply chain’s ability to resist risks and 
effectively control food safety risks through establishing synergy mechanism between all 
the main participant bodies (Rong et al. 2011; Angeles Sanfiel-Fumero et al. 2012; Chen 
et al. 2014; Bruzzone et al. 2014; Eksoz et al. 2014; Migliore et al. 2015; Tang et al. 2015). 
However, the few aforementioned studies deeply investigate the propagation law of food 
safety risk in the food supply chain and its influential factors and mechanism. In fact, the 
unbalance of supply-demand and membership in the food supply chain can significantly 
affect food safety and its risk spread, and the members behavior. Therefore, in our paper, 
we will consider the effect of the characteristic of the supply-demand relationship and 
government supervision behaviors on the risk spread of food safety and the behaviors of 
the food producers and the food retailers to find out the propagation law of food safety 
risk in the food supply chain and its influential factors and mechanism. Our objective is 
to understand the influence of the supply-demand relationship and government supervi-
sion behaviors on the risk spread of food safety and the behaviors of the food producers 
and the food retailers.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. “Second section” makes some assump-
tions and notations for the following investigation. “Third section” defines the contagious 
process and feature of food safety risk, and build an spread model of food safety risk in 
the supply chain. “Fourth section” uses numerical simulations to analyze the influence 
and active mechanism of the supply-demand relationship and government supervision 
behaviors on the risk spread of food safety and the behaviors of the food producers and 
the food retailers. Finally, the last Section summarizes some concluding remarks.
Notations
The notation used in this paper can be summarized as follows:
  • D is the food demand of consumers within a certain stage, and D > 0;
  • R is the food purchase orders of the food retailers to the food producers in the cur-
rent, and R > 0;
  • Q is the maximum output of the food producers to provide qualified food, and Q > 0 ;
  • Ppr is the trading price between the food producers and the food retailers; Prc is the 
trading price between the food retailers and consumers;
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  • cp is the purchasing cost of the raw material of the food producers, cpp is the food 
processing cost of the food producers, crs is the food selling cost of the food retailers, 
cs is the food sampling cost of the food retailers. And cp > 0, cpp > 0, crs > 0, cs > 0;
  • qp is the raw material adulteration probability of the food producers, qs is the sam-
pling probability of the food retailers. And qp > 0, qs > 0;
  • gp is the sampling probability of the government in the production link of the food 
producers, gr is the sampling probability of the government in the retail link of the 
food retailers. And gp > 0, gr > 0;
  • φp is the mean of the fraction defective of products that provided by the food pro-
ducers within the nearly three phase, φr is the mean of the sampling rate of the food 
retailers within the nearly three phase. And φp > 0, φr > 0;
  • α is the growth rate of food output when the food producers adulterate inferior mate-
rials. In other words, if one unit of food product is adulterated inferior materials, the 
food producers can obtain 1+ α unqualified products;
  • Fp is the unit penalty amount for the food producers after the government tests to 
the unqualified products in the production link of the food producers. Fr is the unit 
penalty amount for the food retailers after the government tests to the unqualified 
products in the retail link of the food retailers;
  • β1 is the probability of taking legal action to defend their rights and interests after 
consumers find unqualified products, β2 is the probability of winning after consum-
ers take legal action;
  • ψ is the benefit of winning after consumers take legal action;
  • θ is compensation ratio of the food producers to the food retailers if the unqualified 
products are found by the government in the retail link. In fact, for θ > 0, there will 
be collusion behaviors of the food producers and the food retailers. In this paper, We 
assume 0 < θ < 1. And θ is smaller, the smaller the degree of collusion between the 
food producers and the food retailers.
The contagion model of food safety risk in the food supply chain
The contagion mechanism of food safety risk
The food supply chain is mainly composed of the raw materials suppliers, the food pro-
ducers, the food retailers, the consumers and the regulators. In the food supply chain, 
the illegal economic behaviors of the raw materials suppliers, the food producers, and 
the food retailers will cause kinds of food safety risk. However, the regulators regulate 
the economic behaviors of the raw materials suppliers, the food producers, and the food 
retailers. At the same time, the regulators also safeguard the rights and interests of all 
the behavior subjects. The regulators would ensure the orderly operation of the food 
supply chain. In the different stage, every supply chain members have their own behav-
ior choice. However, some illegal economic behaviors will lead to food safety risk. In 
food supply chain, the behavior choice of each supply chain member as follows.
1. For the raw materials suppliers, they have two kinds of behavior choices. (1) Provid-
ing safe and qualified raw materials to the food producers. (2) Providing adulterated 
inferior materials to the food producers. In this case, the raw materials suppliers can 
provide more raw materials to the food producers, and would obtain more abnormal 
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income. But this behavior will cause food safety risk, and transfer to the food produc-
ers.
2. For the food producers, their behaviors include two aspects. On the one hand, for 
behavior choice of the purchasing of raw materials. (1) Strict inspection for raw 
materials. But this behavior will increase the manufacturer’s purchasing cost. (2) 
Weak inspecting or no inspecting for raw materials. This would save the manufactur-
er’s purchasing cost, and increase the food supply. However, this behavior will cause 
food safety risk, and transfer to the downstream of the food supply chain. On the 
other hand, for behavior choice of the food production. (1) Strictly comply with the 
technology and standards of food production to process and make qualified product. 
(2) Illegal using additives, adulterating inferior materials, or simplifying the food pro-
cessing craft to process and make product. This would greatly save the manufactur-
er’s production cost, and increase the food supply. However, this behavior will cause 
food safety risk, and transfer to the downstream of the food supply chain.
3. For the food retailers, they have two kinds of behavior choices. (1) Strict inspecting 
the upstream provided products of the food supply chain, and selling the qualified 
products to the consumers. (2) Weak inspecting or no inspecting the upstream pro-
vided products of the food supply chain. This behavior would greatly save the food 
retailers’ selling cost. But this will lead many products including the safety risk to be 
sell to the consumers.
4. For the consumers, they have two kinds of behavior choices in the face of unquali-
fied or substandard food. (1) Depressed to go away and not taking legal action to 
defend their rights and interests after finding unqualified products. This behavior will 
indulge the upstream of the food supply chain to choice the risk behaviors. (2) Taking 
legal action to defend their rights and interests after finding unqualified products.
5. For the food regulators, their behaviors include two aspects. On the one hand, the 
behavior choice for supervising and managing of the food safety risk. (1) Strict 
inspecting every segment of the food supply chain, and severe punishment on illegal 
node in the food supply chain. This behavior will greatly increase the cost of illegal-
ity of the node, and restrain the occurrence of food safety risk. (2) Weak inspect-
ing every segment of the food supply chain, and light punishment on illegal node in 
the food supply chain. This would lose the effect of supervise, and increase the inci-
dence probability of food safety risk. On the other hand, the behavior choice for the 
prosecuting of the problem of food unsafe. (1) Positive dealing with complaint, and 
severely punish the illegal node in the food supply chain. This can effectively protect 
the interests of the related subject, and restrain the occurrence of food safety risk. (2) 
Negative dealing with complaint. This will lead to the food safety risk unrestrained 
spread in the food supply chain.
In this paper, we assume the food safety risk is caused by illegal using additives, adul-
terating inferior materials, or simplifying the food processing craft. In other word, the 
spread of the food safety risk from the food producers to the food retailers and the con-
sumers in the food supply chain. Thus the spread sequence structure model of food 
safety risk in the supply chain as shown in Fig. 1.
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The model assumptions
According to Fig. 1, the supervision of food safety risk is a complex system engineering. 
In the process of the regulation, many market participants will be involved. In order to 
effectively analyze the contagion mechanism of the food safety risk in the food supply 
chain, we do some assumptions of the model as follows: 
1. We assume the raw material suppliers are able to provide enough the needed raw 
materials of food producers. And there is no adulteration behavior of hazardous sub-
stances of the raw materials suppliers, the food producers and the food retailers in 
the food supply chain. In other words, the food safety risk is caused by illegal using 
additives, adulterating inferior materials, or simplifying the food processing craft in 
the process of food production and sales, rather than raw materials provider’s prob-
lem;
2. We assume the behaviors of illegal using additives, adulterating inferior materials, 
or simplifying the food processing craft can increase the level of supply, and the cost 
can be ignored;
3. We assume the food is easy to corrosion, and has high request to the shelf life. If 
there is no successful trading within the shelf life, the food must be scrapped;
4. We assume the food producers purchase raw materials and production quantity is 
based on the retailer’s orders;
5. We assume the contagion of food safety risk is no cross tiers and reverse in the food 
supply chain. In other words, the contagion of food safety risk is from the raw mate-
rials suppliers to the food producers, the food producers to the food retailers, the 
food retailer to consumers;
6. We assume that if the government found problems in the sampling inspection, the 
government punish only the sampled node. But if it is the quality problem within the 
product qualified period, the retailers are able to request the part compensation from 
the food producers.
The contagion model of food safety risk
Decision model of the food retailers in the face of the contagion model of food safety risk
According to the above, we use Hpf  to mark the probability of the unqualified products. 
Thus based on the historical trading data between the food retailers and the food manu-
facturers, the food retailers would estimate the probability of the unqualified products 
that were provided by the food manufacturers as follow.
Fig. 1 The spread sequence structure model of food safety risk in the supply chain
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Thus if the food retailers can obtain the probability of the unqualified products that 
were provided by the food manufacturers, the food retailers need to submit the food 
order quantity R to the food producers as follow.
where we can obtain the correlation between the order quantity and the demand quan-
tity. At the same time, the food retailers could estimate the order quantity of the unqual-
ified of products and all kinds of cost. Thus the expected return of the food retailers by 
selling purchased food as follow.
where Rcsqs is the food sampling cost of the food retailers. RHpf (1− gr)β1β2ψ is the 
compensation of selling unqualified products for the consumers after this behavior is 
discovered by the consumers. RHpf 2grFr is the fine of selling unqualified products that 
is discovered by the sampling behavior of the government in the retail link of the food 
retailers. RHpf 2grFrθ is the punishment compensation of the food manufacturers for the 
unqualified products that is discovered by the sampling rate of the government in the 
retail link of the food retailers. Namely,
Proposition 1 For the food retailers, the optimal sampling rate of the food retailers as 
follow:
Proof According to the Eq. (4), we can get
According to the Eq. (7), we can get ∂2Er
∂qs2
≤ 0. Thus the function Er of the sampling rate 
qs of the food retailers is a concave function.
According to the above, if the food retailers want to maximize their profit, the sam-
pling rate qs of the food retailers must satisfy ∂Er∂qs = 0. Thus we can get the Eq. (5).  




(3)Er = DPrc − Dcrs − RPpr − Rcsqs − RHpf (1− gr)β1β2ψ − RHpf
2grFr(1− θ)
(4)
Er = D[Prc − crs −
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Decision model of the food retailers in the face of the contagion model of food safety risk
According to the behavior of the food retailers and the historical trading data between 
the food retailers and the food manufacturers, we can obtain the mean φr of the sam-
pling rate of the food retailers in the nearly three phase, and estimate the sampling rate 
gs of the government in the production link of the food producers. Thus for rational 
food manufacturers, they would abandon the behavior of the adulteration and provide 
qualified food when R  Q. The reason is that the behavior of the adulteration can-
not increase income of the food manufacturers, and wold reduce earnings of the food 
manufacturers. When R > Q, the food manufacturers will increase the supply of food by 
adulterate inferior materials, which further increase earnings of the food manufacturers. 
Thus when R  Q, the expected return of the food manufacturers as follow.
When R > Q, the relationship between the food purchase orders of the food retailers 
and the food supply of the food manufacturers is
Thus when R > Q, the expected return of the food manufacturers as follow
Namely,
Proposition 2 For the food manufacturers, the optimal raw material adulteration rate 
of the food manufacturers as follow:
Proof According to the Eq. (11), we can get




≤ 0. Thus the function Ep of the raw mate-
rial adulteration rate qp of the food manufacturers is a concave function.
According to the above, if the food manufacturers want to maximize their earnings, 
the raw material adulteration rate qp of the food manufacturers must satisfy ∂Ep∂qp = 0. 
Thus we can get the Eq. (12).
(8)Ep = R(Ppr − cp − cpp)
(9)R = Q(1− qp)+ Qqp(1+ α)
(10)Ep = RPpr − R(cp + cpp)− Qqp2(1+ α)gpFp − RHpf (1− gp)(1− φr)qpgrFrθ
(11)
Ep = Q(1+ qpα)
[






α(Ppr − cp − cpp)− (1− qs)(1− gp)(1− φr)φpgrFrθ
2α(1− qs)(1− gp)(1− φr)φpgrFrθ + 2(1+ α)gpFp








=− 2Qα(1− qs)(1− gp)(1− φr)φpgrFrθ − 2Q(1+ α)gpFp
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The simulation analysis of the contagion model of food safety risk under the 
disturbance of the supply and demand
In the spread model of food safety risk, the risk behaviors of the food manufacturers will 
be spread along with the food supply chain. In the spread process of food safety risk, 
raw materials suppliers, food producers, food retailers, government regulators, and con-
sumers will make different behaviors to optimize their goals for meeting their purposes 
under the different circumstances. However, given the absence of a large amount of time 
series data for empirical tests, numerical simulation analysis is the most effective testing 
method. Such analysis is conducted by considering the different values of the parameters 
in the spread model of food safety risk under the disturbance of the supply and demand. 
The following are assumed: Fp = 500, Fr = 800, Ppr = 60, Cp = 30, Cs = 40, Cpp = 10 , 
α = 2, φp = 0.15, φr = 0.35, θ = 0.3, ψ = 1200, D = 10, 000, Q = 10, 000. Thus we use 
simulation analysis to find the spreading rules of food safety risk and behavioral strategy 
selection of the food producers and the food retailers under the disturbance of the sup-
ply and demand.
The risk contagion mechanism of unsafe food and the behavioral choice of the food 
producers and the food retailers
In Fig.  2, we described the influencing mechanism of the supply-demand relationship 
and government supervision on the risk spread of food safety and the behaviors of the 
food producers and the food retailers. From Fig.  2a, b, under the constraints of fixed 
price and cost, with the increase in the imbalance of the supply-demand relationship, 
the risk spread rate of unsafe food appeared the phenomenon of accelerated increasing. 
However, due to the existing of government supervision, the risk spread rate of unsafe 
food is difficult to reach the upper bound 20 %. And the effects of the behaviors of gov-
ernment supervision are more significant to control the risk spread of unsafe food. In 
addition, under the lower compensation ratio of the food producers to the food retailers 
if the unqualified products are found by the government in the retail link, the effect of 
the sampling behavior of the government in the retail link on controlling the risk spread 
of unsafe food is more significant than the sampling behavior of the government in the 
production link. This reason is that the sampling behavior of the government in the 
retail link strengthened the sampling rate of the food retailers, and which will reduce the 
raw material adulteration rate of the food producers. In Fig. 2c, d, we found that, with 
the increase in the degree of the imbalance of the supply-demand relationship, the sam-
pling rate of the food retailers accelerated increasing. And the sampling behavior of the 
government in the retail link promoted the sampling rate of the food retailers, but the 
sampling behavior of the government in the production link weakened the sampling rate 
of the food retailers. This implied that the food retailers had the typical adverse selection 
behavior for the sampling behavior of the government in the production link. This also 
verify the above results Fig. 2a, b again. In Fig. 2e, f, with the increase in the degree of the 
imbalance of the supply-demand relationship, the raw material adulteration rate of the 
food producers accelerated increasing. However, government supervision behaviors can 
effectively controlled the raw material adulteration behavior of the food producers, and 
significantly reduced the raw material adulteration rate of the food producers. And the 
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effect of the sampling behavior of the government in the production link on controlling 
and weakening the raw material adulteration behavior of the food producers is more sig-
nificant than the sampling behavior of the government in the retail link.





















































































































































































































































































a  g b  g
c  g d  g
















Fig. 2 The influencing mechanism of the supply-demand relationship and government supervision on the 
risk spread of food safety and the behaviors of the food producers and the food retailers. a, b the effect of the 
supply-demand relationship on the spread rate of unsafe food risk under different government supervision 
behaviors; c, d the effect of the supply-demand relationship on the sampling rate of the food retailers under 
different government supervision behaviors; e, f the effect of the supply-demand relationship on the raw 
material adulteration rate of the food producers under different government supervision behaviors
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In Fig. 3, with the increase in the probability of taking legal action to defend their rights 
after consumers find unqualified products and the probability of winning after consum-
ers take legal action on the risk spread of unsafe food, the risk spread rate of unsafe food 
appeared the downward trend. This implied that intensifying the awareness of consumer 
rights protection and enhancing in the level of legal protection for consumer rights can 
weakened in certain extent the risk spread of unsafe food. This also implied that inten-
sifying the awareness of consumer rights protection and enhancing in the level of legal 
protection of consumer rights effectively increased the pressure on the internal control 
of food safety for the food producers and the food retailers, and promoted them to pro-
duce or sell more safe food production. Thus the government should build effective sys-
tem of consumer rights protection, and inspire consumer taking legal action to defend 
their rights and interests when they finding unqualified products.
The effect of the regulation behavioral choice of government on the contagion rate 
of unsafe food risk and the behaviors of the food producers and the food retailers
In Fig. 4, we assumed that the government will have two kinds of regulation behavio-
ral choices: the static regulation behavior and the dynamic regulation behavior. And 
let the parameter gr = gp = 0.35 of the static regulation behavior and the parameter 
gr = gp = 0.2 ∗ D/Q of the dynamic regulation behavior. Thus we found that the effect of 
the dynamic regulation behavior is more significant than the static regulation behavior 
under the imbalance of the supply-demand relationship. In Fig. 4a, relative to the static 
regulation behavior where the dynamic regulation behavior more significantly decreased 
the risk spread rate of unsafe food. In Fig. 4b, relative to the static regulation behavior 
where the dynamic regulation behavior more significantly increased the sampling rate of 
the food retailers. In Fig. 4c, relative to the static regulation behavior where the dynamic 
regulation behavior more significantly decreased the raw material adulteration rate of 
the food producers.










































































Fig. 3 a The effect of the probability of taking legal action to defend their rights and interests after consum-
ers find unqualified products on the spread rate of unsafe food risk; b the effect of the probability of winning 
after consumers take legal action on the spread rate of unsafe food risk
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Conclusion
In this paper, we design a food safety risk spread model from food producer-to-con-
sumer in the food supply chain based on the the imbalance of the supply-demand rela-
tionship of food. We use theoretical analysis and numerical simulation to describe the 
influence and active mechanism of the supply-demand relationship and government 
supervision behaviors on the risk spread of food safety and the behaviors of the food 
producers and the food retailers. We also analyze the effect of the awareness of con-
sumer rights protection and the level of legal protection of consumer rights on the risk 
spread of food safety. The theoretical analysis and numerical simulation result showed 
that, (1) with the increase in the imbalance of the supply-demand relationship, the risk 
spread rate of unsafe food appeared the phenomenon of accelerated increasing. Thus 
stabilize the market supply-demand relationship of food is most important part of gov-
ernment regulatory. (2) the behaviors of government supervision behaviors and strategy 
choice more significant effect on controlling the risk spread of unsafe food, enhancing 
the sampling rate of the food retailers, and decreasing the raw material adulteration rate 
of the food producers. Thus the government should strengthen the many-links supervi-
sion of food supply chain. (3) intensifying the awareness of consumer rights protection 
and enhancing in the level of legal protection of consumer rights effectively decreased 
the risk spread rate of unsafe food. Thus the government should build effective system 
of consumer rights protection, and inspire consumer taking legal action to defend their 
rights and interests when they finding unqualified products. Certainly, this model and 
numerical simulation also have certain scope of application and limitations, for example 
the variable design and parameter value selection, and the demand elasticity character-
istics of food productions and so on. Thus we will further deepen and expand in future 
study.
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Fig. 4 The influencing mechanism of the supply-demand relationship on the risk spread of food safety 
and the behaviors of the food producers and the food retailers under the static regulation behavior and the 
dynamic regulation behavior
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